book review, Volume 3 number 9, October 2001 Books on the Taliban Taliban The Taliban Prior to September 11th few Americans could locate Afghanistan on a map, much less describe the Taliban, the militant Islamic group presently controlling most of that country. Even George W. Bush in one of his many gaffes during the 2000 campaign seemed befuddled as to who or what the Taliban is. Obviously all that has changed, and as I write this (September 28th) an American military conflict with Afghanistan appears imminent. The Taliban emerged quite suddenly in 1994 in the southern Afghan city of Kandahar where a civil war raged between opposing factions of the Mujahidin, the loose knit alliance of guerrilla groups that successfully defeated the Soviet Union during the 1980s. Within two and a half years the Taliban controlled most of the country, including the capitol city of Kabul. They reopened the highways, exiled or killed most of their foes, disarmed the population, and introduced a semblance of peace. Their strict application of sharia (Islamic law) was welcomed by a war-weary population desperate for order. The Taliban have since forged an atrocious human rights record, bedeviled relief agencies, imprisoned or killed foreign workers, harbored terrorists, and become international pariahs. More of a junta than a government, the Taliban runs Afghanistan in a highly decentralized fashion with village chiefs working more or less autonomously under the edicts of Mullah Mohammed Omar, the group’s reclusive (and illiterate) leader. This history is laid out by Ahmed Rashid in Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism. The veteran Pakistani journalist distills two decades of first-hand reporting from Afghanistan into what is at present the most comprehensive book available on the topic. A fierce critic of the Taliban, Rashid details its gruesome rise to power, outlines its organizational structure, traces its involvement in terrorism and opium production, recounts its abysmal brutalizing of the Afghani people, and places the movement in the geopolitical and economic struggles of the 1990s. Rashid is particularly critical of his own country’s role in bringing the Taliban to power (the group originated in the madrasas, religious schools located in the Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan). Seeking to become a regional superpower, Pakistan allied with the Taliban in an effort to open up highways and trade to the formerly Soviet, Central Asian Republics (C.A.R.) which lie to the north. The ultimate goal is to run pipelines from the untapped oil fields which lie in the C.A.R. across Afghanistan and Pakistan to the Indian Ocean. The American company UNOCAL has been particularly active in pursuing this endeavor. For much of the nineties UNOCAL management considered the Taliban the best hope for regional stability. This prompted both the Clinton administration and Congress to favor the Taliban, though they offered no direct support. This element of the story has received scant play in the media. Given the heavy oil industry influence on the Bush administration (which includes several former UNOCAL executives), it is likely that oil prospects will factor strongly in Bush’s long-range policy objectives for the region. This in turn will aggravate conflicts with the Russians who view the C.A.R. as lying within their sphere of influence, and who feel the oil is rightfully theirs. Rashid attacks the Taliban’s interpretation of Islam, particularly in their treatment of women. Less judgmental on this front is Peter Marsden whose The Taliban: War, Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan attempts to bridge some of the cultural divide between the Taliban and the West. Marsden, an expert on the Middle East who has been involved in relief efforts in Afghanistan, explains the manner in which the Taliban uniquely fits the nature of Afghani society and places the movement in the context of recent Islamic radicalism. Unfortunately, in trying to be fair to the Taliban he glosses over many of their sins. By downplaying their human rights record, questioning their clear involvement in some horrific crimes, and claiming their treatment of women may not be all that bad, he places himself beyond the pale of reality. Marsden is clearly wrong in his claim that the Taliban do not seek to influence the greater Islamic world. As Rashid documents, through their involvement with Saudi dissident Osama bin Laden, the hosting of terrorist training camps, and agitation in neighboring regions, the Taliban is actively working to ignite a militant pan-Islamic movement. They have already enjoyed some success in this. Particularly frightening is the extent of influence they now have over the Pakistani population, including roughly half of its ruling military. If the U.S. stages attacks on the Taliban from Pakistan, there is considerable chance this could spark a civil war there. America would then have no choice but to enter this conflict to prevent Taliban friendly forces from accessing Pakistan’s nuclear stockpiles. The Clinton administration did not begin assessing the danger of the Taliban until bin Laden struck our embassies in 1998. Congress, busy obsessing over the president’s sex life, failed in its job of providing oversight. The Bush administration did not seriously acknowledge the Taliban threat until September 11th, instead placing its national security efforts in a push for missile defense, which shovels billions of government dollars to big campaign donors. All parties were repeatedly warned of the Taliban’s potential danger to global stability. Thousands of American lives later, our government is finally waking up.
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